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The Army's and the Department of Defense's (DOD) aviation maintenance structure is an inefficient and marginally effective relic of the Cold War. DOD and Army maintenance structures have implemented a patchwork series of reforms since the 1980s that have been partially applied, insufficiently integrated and marginally effective. Army aviation organic and support maintenance performance has slowly declined over the past twenty years. 1 Similarly, the Air Force has faced readiness challenges across its fleets as Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) and deployments continue to press against institutional structural limitations. 2 While various services continue to espouse a desire to increase joint operations and interoperability, the majority of changes within their respective aviation maintenance communities have been parochial. They optimize service unique portions of the maintenance system. Future budgetary and operational realities will demand that the services operate their expensive aviation operations more efficiently and effectively.
The key to the success of applying reforms to the aviation sustainment community is to understand the complexities and uniqueness of aviation businesses and to apply realistic and constructive reforms to the realities faced by aviation maintainers and operators. Modern business practices and functional consolidation across the services will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of military aviation support operations throughout the world.
Each service in the military creates its own maintenance requirements, contract specifications, and competes individually for all support services. In the limited world of aviation support services not only are the maintenance requirements uncoordinated, they often compete with one another on pricing, manpower, parts and other sustainment issues. Each service and agency sub-optimizes their procurement, maintenance, overhaul and sustainment operations for their perceived needs. The result is a hodgepodge of organic as well as contract support organizations and procedures that is cumbersome and inefficient. Aviation maintenance should be integrated and consolidated in order to maximize overall systemic efficiency and effectiveness.
Methodology
This study proposes to examine the mechanisms of aviation maintenance across the DOD against the business model of successfully transformed civilian aviation operations. The analysis will begin by identifying historically where previous attempts at transformation have sub-optimized the current maintenance system.
The study will then lay a foundation for maintenance transformation and integration by examining how successful and profitable cargo and passenger carriers have evolved in the changing aviation environment of the late 20 th and early 21 st Centuries. Finally, by applying the lessons learned from past transformation attempts and civilian business models, the study will integrate the maintenance structures of the DOD to the reality faced by the military services today, using the United States Army as the model for integration. Although the Army's aircraft fleet is primarily composed of rotary wing aircraft, maintenance consolidation trends within the civilian industry imply similar structural changes are applicable across the greater rotary and fixed wing aviation communities.
Military Maintenance Transformation Since the End of the Cold War:
The end of the Cold War resulted in numerous initiatives to reduce the cost and duplication of efforts throughout DOD and the Government. The Defense Department attempted to streamline operations in many different areas over the past 16 years. Aviation maintenance operations throughout DOD have undergone review and change in a pieced-together, subsystemic manner since 1989. 3 In most cases, DOD has not holistically implemented aviation maintenance structural changes within the Army, the other military services, or the myriad of governmental departments.
The Army Air Corps' World War II support structure was the basic organizational paradigm used by most civilian airlines and militaries in the aviation business revolution and expansion that occurred after 1945. Although the Army changed staffing to reflect reduced unit aircraft numbers during organizational changes, the maintenance structure of Army aviation has remained essentially unchanged since the end of the WWII. 4 Since the 1980s, the world's civilian aviation maintenance structure has undergone dramatic changes as traditional airlines faced economic challenges from low-cost carriers and package transport services. 5 DOD, in reaction to budgetary pressure to reduce costs in the 1990s, began to examine leading business models and civilian management initiatives in an attempt to reduce costs and increase efficiency.
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The Army also experimented with several popular business management strategies to temporarily reduce costs while reducing operational risk. 7 These strategies were implemented haphazardly without regards to the business within which the models operated. Business models that worked well for the automotive sector may not have been appropriate for the services sector. The implementation of sub-optimal changes to the installation and logistics side of Army business sectors did not take into account the impact on the remaining structure of Army aviation requirements. 8 The Army recognized the changing maintenance paradigm across the civilian transportation sector and applied individual reforms, such as cost banding, without holistic analysis and implementation strategies. Although DOD realized savings from the application of civilian business models and enterprise solutions, the affects of piecemeal applications of efficiencies strained the aviation maintenance system.
At the same time that the services were attempting to squeeze efficiency from their logistics streams, Congress and the executive branch were trying to impose their vision of efficiency on DOD. Many individually sound ideas including Base Re-alignment and Closure (BRAC), National Partnership for Re-inventing Government initiatives, Title 10 reforms such as Depots 50-50 rule and others were imposed in an unintegrated tangle of legalistic and impractical reform that threw the aviation support system into chaos. 9 BRAC and other reforms changed the process and/or system flow of steady state maintenance operations without a top to bottom remapping and analysis of the process. Although these initiatives may have saved money in the short term, they caused systemic interruptions that were often resolved by workarounds. 10 The organizations of DOD have seen the impacts of the changed maintenance paradigm and have attempted to change accordingly.
Apparently, senior Army leaders in the 1990s recognized three basic courses for reducing aviation costs as they took action in three basic areas. First, under the guise of "Single Stock
Fund", repair parts stock and retention procedures were modified to reduce costs. These took the form of reducing Authorized Stockage Levels (ASLs) and Prescribed Load Lists (PLLs) while reducing the depot stocked quantities of repair parts on hand. Next, a series of transportation streamlining and tracking initiatives were implemented. Finally, the maintenance proponent attempted consolidation and reorganization named "Two-Level maintenance" as a potential solution for maintenance reorganization. Two-Level maintenance is an attempt to capture some of the lessons of the transportation sector's changes without an appropriate holistic systemic analysis of the similarities and differences in the civilian aviation sector. Two-Level maintenance is a good start for the restructuring of maintenance across the DOD but does not address the core weaknesses of the current military maintenance structures including mission resource methods, the recognition of the importance of the industrial base, transportation links, and local repair requirements.
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The physical act of flying an aircraft is relatively the same in any segment of the industry, however not every airline or package carrier is profitable. In order to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of military transformation one should leverage the most applicable lessons of civilian business sector leaders. These lessons should not, however, be applied haphazardly or piecemeal as has been done previously by DOD. Best business practices in both the cargo and passenger sectors of the transportation industry will only transfer successfully when applied to the operational reality and requirements of the Service. As an example, the Air Force cargo fleet could gain much from an examination of FEDEX, but all changes to FEDEX do not immediately translate to the Air Force. Thus, this study proposes examination of the maintenance changes in profitable carriers such as FEDEX and Southwest airlines in the areas of fleet and personnel management, repairables, work loading, and maintenance management. However, the implementation strategy of this examination is proposed to be at the support maintenance level, not the flight line. Although the examples used in this paper are based on the Army's maintenance paradigm, they are practically applicable across the services at the maintenance support level. Although minor flight line changes will occur, the operation of aircraft across services is relatively the same. To facilitate the implementation of an efficient and effective joint aviation maintenance structure, the majority of maintenance efficiencies should focus on business models at the operational support level.
Civilian Initiatives Result In Significant Efficiency Gains Without Reducing Performance.
The civilian aviation industry has greatly transformed over the past 30 years. Two major factors for the transformation appear to be increased competition and changing business models. 12 Competition in the freight and passenger service sectors increased as a result of price wars created by fledgling low-cost carriers applied new business models to reduce costs in four critical maintenance areas: man-power employment, airframe efficiency, repair parts outsourcing and maintenance planning. These changes helped to reduce the costs of operating airlines and allowed small start-ups to rapidly gain market share, compete against traditional industry giants, and maintain profitability and responsiveness in dynamic market conditions. The passenger and freight airline service providers achieved their transformation by focusing on personnel and workload restructuring. They applied a comprehensive business plan integrated across the breadth and depth of the organization, implementing the appropriate changes required to achieve their strategic goals.
Workload management and personnel use are critical to aviation businesses. They are key enablers for profitability, success, and capacity generation in the aviation world. Civilian aviation is consolidating skills around the base set of maintenance competencies: Airframe and Power plant (A&P), electrical, and systems (pneudraulics, hydraulics, air). 13 Airlines with inhouse maintenance tend to have higher maintenance costs but also rely heavily on certified 19 What is important to derive from this, beyond the growth of outsourcing services around the world, is the industry's strategic and forethought decision to focus on certain core maintenance competencies while divesting noncore tasks to outsourcing. Interestingly, Michael Young from FEDEX aircraft maintenance stated that in some cases, the company will retain price loss repair items that are high demand or low availability in order to ensure the company has flexibility to respond in certain maintenance situations. 20 The lesson to be gleaned from civilian industry, in this case, is that the size, structure and capabilities of the organic maintenance organization must be made with the view of the strategic needs and direction of the entire organization in mind.
As airlines and maintenance repair operations determine their core competencies and work areas, a level of specialization, market segregation, and economies of scale develop. OEM such as engine and auxiliary power unit manufacturers have tended to focus on the repair and overhaul of their components. Regional MROs have specialized in specific airframe overhauls and periodic services, most notably "heavy" diagnostic maintenance. 21 A lucrative niche market has developed for aviation specific Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and document management tools. 22 As MROs establish their core areas of competency, the airlines are able to invest in the education of their workforce in specific areas of need. In either case the unused or excess maintenance capacity that is not a part of an identified desired core competency or required profit center is normally outsourced. It is also a model that built substantial inefficiency into the airline's models resulting in economic loss. 27 Setting the Conditions for Aviation Maintenance Consolidation.
Many of the lessons learned from the airlines and cargo carriers over the past twenty years are applicable to the management of Army aviation in particular, and DOD's fleets in general. Many of the solutions for the challenges facing the federal government in streamlining their aviation operations could be adapted from civilian airline business models. As in civilian flight operations, these solutions should be implemented across the breadth of the organization to attain a desired strategic end state. DOD must apply a comprehensive business plan across the organization in order to maintain strategic direction. Personnel specialization, utilization and work-loading improvements must be applied in light of the strategic framework.
The biggest challenge facing DOD may be convincing the federal government to change the established bureaucratic processes required for implementing required changes across the breadth of the organization in order to attain a desired strategic end state. Unlike the civilian business world, which is motivated by shareholder pressure and the reality of bankruptcy, the federal government has little external impetus for efficiency or increased effectiveness. Although there are many arguments for retaining individuality in system support, economies of scale and civilian business models suggest that integrated implementation of aviation support operations across consolidated fleets results in significant savings. The establishment of bureaucratic process change will require an atmosphere and work environment that encourages governmental improvement and accountability to the taxpayer. 28 With the implementation of a government wide strategy, as accomplished for aircraft use and scheduling, and mandatory legislative determination, however, meaningful improvements could be foreseen. Focusing available workload into areas of desired governmental competencies would have the benefit of allowing specialization across the government's vast depot repair facilities.
Organizing the capacity of the depot system along functional lines, regardless of the service owning the depots, would diminish duplication and inefficiency. Similar repair functions across the government could be merged and streamlined, as necessary, to meet whole fleet requirements. This would facilitate the elimination of redundant excess capacity. 36 Similarly, since workload would be assigned across all government production facilities, input for component repair systems could facilitate the system-wide and central management of both components and airframe overhaul. The high level resolution of requirements would ease workload shifting into depots or contract facilities to maintain optimal work-loading across repair facilities. By managing a larger family of similar components, and ensuring compatibility of those components with major aircraft manufacturers, civilian repair facilities would compliment and reinforce government facilities.
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In order to accomplish a complete systemic analysis, one agency must be assigned responsibility and authority. This could be accomplished through the assignment of lead or executive agency, or through the creation of a Defense Aviation Maintenance Agency.
However, the ability to examine the whole DOD fleet will reduce the total number of discrete Assuming DOD is capable of executing the systemic changes required to set the conditions for aviation maintenance integration, each executive agent could then modify their specific support structures and rules to benefit the exact airframe type they support. It is critical that DOD establish a mechanism for disinterested oversight and maintenance of the strategic implementation plan. Each executive agency must conduct periodic review and course corrections of integration and implementation actions ensuring that process improvements are integrated and holistic. 40 In this way, optimizing of their area of expertise would not sub-optimize the entire system. The maintenance system, when aligned holistically, could self-reinforce as necessary, for surge requirements. The need to reduce the aforementioned tactical friction with maintenance operations drives the imperative for the Army to remove the direct link between aviation maintenance operations and tactical aviation operations. In other words, aircraft should be generated to meet mission requirements rather than the arbitrarily reporting and maintaining fleets to a "ramp availability model" as exemplified by the Army's Unit Status Reporting system focusing on mission readiness rates. 43 A potential solution is for the Army to adopt the Air Force model of readiness using sortie generation vice the Army focus on continual operability. An aircraft sitting on the ramp is a measure of potential mission satisfaction but not an indicator of actual mission
availability. An aircraft reported as Fully Mission Capable (FMC) on the ramp does not equate to an aircraft ready for a mission set. Aircraft can be FMC on paper, but be radically limited by impending maintenance requirements, sub-system limitations or mission incompatibility. Finally, aircraft maintenance operations should be unlinked from the purview of operations. This would allow sortie generation to compete freely with sortie execution for resources. In other words, tactical commanders at every level would know that sortie generation requirements above normal rates would incur a corresponding cost in excess of budgeted operations (reimbursable man-hours, higher parts costs, deferred maintenance costs and lost manpower opportunity costs). Thus, if additional sorties were desirable for the commander, maintenance operations would not be expected to generate blank checks or excessive resources that would cause the whole system to move out of balance.
The Army should change its training perspective ensuring maintenance personnel are capable on interacting throughout the maintenance structure. This would require DOD to revamp their entire aviation maintenance personnel structure along civilian fleet models. Two appreciable implications of the new personnel structure for the Army would be skill consolidation along the lines of systemic aircraft maintenance as outlined previously and experiential growth and progression patterns that would mirror civilian aircraft mechanic career patterns. 44 When these changes are practically applied system-wide across DOD, aviation mechanics from one service could, and by design should, be assigned at any level and for any service. 6 Many portions of the Federal bureaucracy underwent downsizing and cost reduction during the 1990s under the Clinton Administrations "re-invention of government" initiatives. The purpose of focusing on the DOD in this case is two-fold. First, because of the "peace-dividend", the DOD experienced the most significant drop in funding (in real dollars). Second, the nonintegrated manner of governmental business decisions undertaken by the DOD highlight the problems that occur when systems are sub-optimized for efficiency without regard to their systemic effects overall. As an example, while the Army was experimenting with management initiatives to generate cost savings, the Air Force and Navy underwent similar cost savings initiatives. Not only were the initiatives poorly coordinated within the sustainment arms of each Service, they were not coordinated cross-service for efficiency and effectiveness needs. 7 The Army alternately experimented with Enterprise Business solutions, Six Sigma (and its current hybrid: Lean Six Sigma), Total Qualitative Management (TQM), outsourcing non-core skills, activity based costing (ABC) and ISO certifications at the wholesale levels, and velocity management, dollar cost banding and Just In Time (JIT) at the retail level. Each "business solution" reaped critical resources for the Army, but placed a great burden on the user level to maintain readiness. Many of these strategies fell out of favor with the business community and were rejected. The impact of the wholesale solutions to the Depots was damaging. 8 Logistics support is a three -legged triad consisting of supply and services, maintenance and repair, and transportation. The complexity of Army operations requires that logistics support operations are coordinated in all three areas. Such that "Just in Time" (JIT) solutions imply a transportation solution, but have significant supply, maintenance and repair components that must be integrated (not wished away) for the solution to be viable. 9 Perhaps no example better illustrates the resultant state of aviation maintenance than the Unit Level Logistics Support System-Aviation (ULLS-A) fielding of the mid-late 1990s. The Army, under pressure to meet the automation initiatives, fielded ULLS-A to users with several functions that were inoperable or semi-operable. Training for soldiers in the field was minimal. The system was plagued with errors and failures. Contrary to Army Regulation and Senior Officer pressure, many tactical units simply refused to continue using the system. 10 An excellent example of the impact of base closing is the study of the AN-ALQ 144 main bearing and similar supply constraints, which were caused by the closing, and liquidation of stocks at certain depots during the base closure process of the 1990s.
11 Almost every discussion of Army versus other service readiness and maintenance eventually turns to the topic of the Service difference in Aircraft readiness reporting and missioning. The Air Force and Navy focus on a sortie generation model for aircraft readiness. The Army and Marine Corps focus on a unit mission generation model. Neither of these models is significantly different in its generation of aircraft for mission accomplishment. I propose that the discussion, while academically interesting, is irrelevant to the discussion of maintenance operations. The relevant issue is maintenance resourcing and the application or utilization of those resources. 12 Increased competition amongst the airlines has driven a recurring search for efficiencies. Similarly, new business models as represented by FEDEX and the low cost carrier models of People's Express, Southwest and Virgin. Additional information on FedEx's business model can be found at http://www.fedex.com/us/about/today/companies/express/a380faqs.html: 14 "Oversight of Maintenance and repair Facility Practices Under Examination", Air Safety Week , Sept. 6, 1999, p. 4. It is important to note that certain repairs, identified as "flight critical" are required to be accomplished by A&P mechanics. Therefore, not all repairs can be accomplished by unlicensed mechanics. 15 William Morris, aircraft mechanic and A&P, TIMCO, Destin, FL, telephone interview with author, 3 Oct 2005. Part 145 operations often hire non-certified mechanics with the stipulation that they continue their education and progression towards A&P certification. The traditional carriers tend to advance their personnel along "trade skills" lines such that the apprentice A&P spends several years applying the trade, then advances to a higher level (traditionally journeyman, craftsmen, master craftsmen but more commonly Level 2, 3 etc). With each level advanced, additional skills are required to be learned through company or self-funded schooling and used on the aircraft fleet. shifting the onus for most repair and replacement tasks to the integrated Aviation Support Battalion. 32 Army enlistees choosing aviation maintenance skills currently incur service obligations as long as eight years total. However, some maintenance specialties allow active duty commitments as low as 15 months with the balance served in the reserves or National Guard. http://www.army.com/news/articles/aarticle_051905_02.html 33 COL S. Remaly, "Maintenance Transformation" briefing slides for the Worldwide Aviation Conference, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, March 2005. MG Pillsbury, the AMCOM commander, has proposed establishing Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Groups, built around the traditional Aviation Classification and Repair Activity Depot (AVCRAD) Commands that, if augmented with several mobile contact and maintenance teams, could perform "heavy maintenance" like phases and damage repair across the breadth of the operational area. This additional construct is not part of MG Pillsbury's briefing but is a natural extension of integrated aviation maintenance operations for the Federal Government. Regional support would establish "repair MROs" in general areas much like the current MRO structure used by the civilian air fleet operators. 34 Fort Rucker and Campbell, because of their high density of assigned aircraft, provide excellent examples of potential staging bases for the integrated contractor and military components of MRO support organizations. During traditional and peacetime operations, the military components would be available to provide additional support to flight operations throughout the region. Upon deployment, the military component could deploy as the contact and support teams of the AVCRAD to sustain flight operations. 35 The Department of Defense often has specific parts performance or waiver requirements that are outlined in Defense Maintenance Work Requirements (DMWR) standards. When the primary customer is a Defense activity, DMWR standards could be substituted for OEM or NMWR standards subject to adjudication to the executive agency for core charge reimbursement. 36 Excess capacity is not necessarily an undesirable attribute. Most "for profit" corporations do not habitually operate at 100% productivity. Retained excess capacity would be determined by governmental agency review in order to retain "surge" or wartime capacity within the Defense Base Operating Fund and Depots programs. 37 There must be one significant caution sounded on the use of civilian MROs. Systems managers must make holistic decisions for the designation of depot core competencies in two areas. First, Aviation Week and Space Technology has published several articles since 2001 noting the rise of Asian and Latin American MRO operations. American cargo and passenger carriers are leveraging these facilities increasingly due to their lower labor and total operations cost. Many critical items may be retained within the government's repair system for National Security reasons. Second, excess organic national repair capacity must be retained during peacetime to ensure that wartime high OPTEMPO requirements will be met.
This argument is an attempt to over-complicate and specialize aviation maintenance requirements. Aircraft are resourced for an availability model. This is true for all uses, both civilian and military. The long term utilization of that availability is the responsibility of the operational manager or commander, while maintainers simply marshal and apply repair resources as efficiently and effectively as possible to meet the operational requirements. Civilian air fleets are limited in their availability as much as military fleets. They are simply managed differently based on perceived needs and perceived surge requirements. 39 These improvements also imply another benefit; lack of competitive bidding by governmental sub-components. Since maintenance requirements will be centrally managed and identified, the Department of Interior will not bid against the Department of Justice for aircraft parts and services thus driving up costs. 40 Mike George, Dave Rowlands and Bill Kastle, What is Lean Six Sigma?. McGraw-Hill, New York, 2004. The authors offer a simple procedure for Lean Six -Sigma implementation that could be extremely useful for tracking the complex integration of aircraft sustainment operations across the DOD. Lean Six Sigma has been implemented in several large commercial corporations and has been proven effective in both maintenance and transactional processes of sustainment operation improvements for the Army's Materiel Command. The use of continual process review, assessment and improvement would ensure that systemic modification does not drift into irrelevance. 41 Phillips , pp.44-45. 42 The Army experimented with evacuation of aircraft to depots and contact teams after Desert Storm (a.k.a. STIR program) and between rotations of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although the evacuations for maintenance have been widely successful, organizational friction has been significant in certain units as tactical commanders have not wanted to "lose their aircraft" for extended periods of time. 43 Army Regulation 220-1 requires units to report aircraft readiness based on system and subsystem operability. Aircraft are reported as "Fully Mission Capable, Partially Mission Capable, or "Not Mission Capable" on a continuous clock basis throughout a cyclical month. This methodology favors short term maintenance solutions in pursuit of maintenance goals as opposed to flexing aircraft for actual mission requirements. Mission requirement metrics, such as Fort Rucker's fleet "sortie generation" or the Air Force "sortie completion" models are fundamentally different metrics which provide the tactical commander significant planning flexibility while allowing maintainers to make better long-term decisions. 44 The Army and other Services have attempted several iterations of MOS consolidation and streamlining. These reorganizations have been sub-optimal attempts to glean spaces for other reorganizations without regard for the complete needs of the Defense Department's aviation structure. When the system is integrated, however, obvious "strategic advantages" may be identified throughout the Department as a whole. For example, it may be advantageous for the services to procure "power by the hour" from auxiliary power unit OEMs to focus on airframe and power plant mechanics. By leveraging excess capability and determining critical core competencies across the DOD, the critical resource of manpower availability could be managed more effectively. 45 An excellent example of this could be in the area of avionics, electrical, hydraulic and pneudraulics repairs. System components and diagnostic and test equipment for these areas are similar throughout the civilian aircraft fleet. Procedures can be designed to be followed by any generally competent mechanic. The replacement of pitot tubing for a light helicopter is essentially the same as for a heavy bomber. Similarly, if avionics are standardized across fleets, there will be little need for a system specific repairer. 46 Edward H. Phillips. "Cargo Carriers Seek Stronger Ties with MRO providers", Aviation Week & Space Technology, New York: Aug 27, 2001. Vol. 155, Iss. 9; p.61. The author quotes FEDEX vice president Mike Cukor as stating: "the company has had long term relationships with contract maintenance and repair operations" and will continue to do so in the future. 47 Certain aircraft specific items such as Aviation Survivability equipment and avionics require personnel with Secret or Top Secret clearances to accomplish repair. This requirement should not be the only consideration when evaluating a component for outsourcing, however, these requirements may significantly increase the cost or repair and overhaul. 48 This would end the practice of DLR repair at the unit or organizational level. This is required in order to prolong the serviceability of end items and ensure the continued high quality of repair parts. In this way, the period between repetitive maintenance actions on the same component, assembly or airframe should be extended. This will reduce the line mechanics' "touches" on the aircraft. 49 The Department of Defense has the largest aircraft fleet by far in the federal government. 
